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1 Introduction 
In recent years reader-response theorists have begun to explore the potential of the ‘second-
generation’ enactivist theory of cognition for the analysis of readers’ quasi-visual responses to 
literature.2 While these studies bring to bear a range of perspectives on the phenomenon by 
which readers may at times feel that they can vividly and directly perceive the storyworld, they 
converge on a view of vision and imagination, not as driven by mental images ‘seen’ with the 
mind’s eye (the positing of internal representations being a central tenet of ‘first-generation’ 
cognitive studies), but as enactive, that is a way of acting. As I will explain in greater detail 
below, enactivism posits that (quasi-)visual experience is not all ‘in the head’, but emerges 
through interactions with the world around us. In this chapter I wish to contend that there are 
salient and non-trivial points of resemblance between these enactivist views of the readerly 
imagination and the ancient rhetorical concept of enargeia (usually translated ‘vividness’). This 
term, which on a minimal ancient definition is said to be ‘speech which brings the subject-
matter before the eyes’, figures prominently in ancient criticism and rhetoric and is used in 
particular to characterize the vivid, quasi-visual effects which epic poetry, historiography, 
oratory and occasionally other kinds of literature may have on readers.3  
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Now, at first sight this contention must appear implausible. For, whilst acknowledging that 
enargeia is a multifaceted concept, recent classical scholarship holds that the term primarily 
refers to ‘pictorial vividness’, as brought about through the transference of picture-like internal 
representations from author to reader by means of detailed descriptions (ekphrasis), and this 
account ostensibly matches the references to concepts like ‘mental images’ and ‘the mind’s 
eye’ found in ancient comments.4 Thus, a scholiast (Σ bT Il. 23.363-72) praises the first lines 
of the description of the horse race for Patroclus’ funeral games in the Iliad by stating that 
Homer ‘has projected the entire mental image (phantasia) so vividly (enargōs) that the readers 
are no less captivated than the spectators (theatōn)’. Plutarch (Artaxerxes 8.1) expresses 
admiration for Xenophon’s account of the Battle of Cunaxa in the Anabasis, on the ground that 
‘Xenophon brings it all but before the eyes (opsei) and through his vividness (enargeian) all 
the time places the reader, much affected and sharing in the dangers, near to the action, as if it 
had not been concluded, but is going on’. Quintilian (Institutio oratoria 8.3.62), finally, calls 
enargeia a ‘great virtue’ (magna virtus) of style, claiming that ‘a speech does not adequately 
fulfil its purpose or attain the total domination (plene dominatur) it should have, if it goes no 
further than the ears, and the judge feels that he is merely being told the story of the matters he 
has to decide, without their being brought out and shown to his mind’s eye (oculis mentis)’. 
Given this emphasis in our ancient sources, the case for a non-pictorialist, enactivist 
interpretation of ancient enargeia will have to be made carefully and gradually. I shall first 
summarise the prevailing ‘pictorialist’ account and show that supplementing it with an 
alternative approach is both desirable and methodologically feasible. I will then introduce the 
main tenets of the enactivist account of vision and imagination, before presenting two case 
studies which show that this account is often better able to deal with the way ancient critics 
speak about enargeia than the pictorialist one. The goal of this chapter is twofold. On the one 
hand, by illuminating aspects of enargeia which the pictorialist account plays down or leaves 
unexplained, I aim to contribute to a deeper understanding of ancient reading habits. On the 
other hand, I also hope that, conversely, critics’ on-going efforts to shape a second-generation 
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cognitive criticism may benefit from taking note of the ancient rhetorical tradition, which they 
have so far largely ignored. 
 
2 Enargeia and Phantasia: the Pictorialist Account 
 
Ancient remarks on enargeia like those quoted at the outset evince a confidence in the 
feasibility and efficacy of quasi-visual reader responses which contrasts sharply with modern 
critical attitudes to the phenomenon. To be sure, folk-psychological assumptions about how the 
imagination works still make it seem plausible that we might in theory be able to ‘picture’, say, 
Mme Bovary or a room she is in when we come across sufficiently detailed descriptions whilst 
reading Flaubert’s novel.5 However, most readers actually experience mental images as feeble 
and fleeting and as rarely, if ever, attaining anything like the vivacity and vitality of actual 
visual perception.6 Partly for this reason, modern critics for a long time did not set much store 
by quasi-visual responses and tended to distinguish them sharply from (supposedly more 
rewarding) intellectual and reflective types of response.7 Iser, for instance, arguably the most 
influential reader-response theorist of the past half century or so, concedes that mental imagery 
‘accompanies’ reading, but insists that it remains distinguished by its ‘optical poverty’, as 
becomes evident when ‘one sees the film version of a novel one has read’; verbal descriptions, 
are not so much processed mimetically, that is by imaginatively perceiving their referents, as 
semiotically, that is on the basis of the words’ conceptual meanings and connotations: ‘Even if 
we are given a detailed description of a character’s appearance, we tend not to regard it as pure 
description, but try and conceive what is actually to be communicated through it’.8 
The terminology used by ancient critics is often thought to be revealing of certain 
preconceptions about vision, imagination and language which help explain the difference 
between ancient and modern attitudes. In particular, scholars have pointed out that in Hellenistic 
(especially Stoic) philosophy phantasiai were, at least in part, conceived of as pictorial images 
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that were permanently stored in memory in the form of physical imprints on the mind; they 
were thought to form as a result of visual perception and in turn to give rise to, and be originary 
of, thought and language. The term enargeia itself was used in this connection to refer to 
situations in which phantasiai are grasped with particular ‘clarity’ and we can accept them as 
true and accurate representations of the world. These ideas, so the argument goes, informed 
ancient criticism and made that mental images were regarded as potentially very vivid and as 
the indispensable medium connecting the visual and the verbal on the one hand, and perception, 
imagination (‘seeing’ in the mind’s eye) and conceptual thought on the other. Specifically, 
ancient critics will have supposed that the individual items in a detailed description (ekphrasis) 
could elicit lifelike mental images from readers’ memories which they pieced together until 
they saw a detailed ‘picture’ of the description’s referent in the mind’s eye.9 
In order to see how this is supposed to have worked out in practice, we turn to a much-
discussed passage from Quintilian, one of our richest sources. Quintilian’s remark, quoted in 
the previous section, that a speech, provided it possesses the quality of enargeia, may come to 
‘dominate’ the judge, introduces his treatment of enargeia as an element of the ornate style.10 
He next declares that an elaborate analysis would be cumbersome (Inst. 8.3.63) and then mostly 
contents himself with citing a number of passages which apparently achieve the coveted effect. 
Among these is a vignette of the aftermath of a luxurious banquet from an otherwise lost speech 
of Cicero’s, which was presumably designed to stir the audience’s indignation: 
 
‘videbar videre alios intrantis, alios autem exeuntis, quosdam ex vino vacillantis, quosdam 
hesterna ex potatione oscitantis. humus erat inmunda, lutulenta vino, coronis languidulis et 
spinis cooperta piscium’: quid plus videret qui intrasset? (Quint. Inst. 8.3.66) 
 
‘I seemed to see some coming in, some going out, some reeling with drink, some dozing 
after yesterday’s potations. The floor was filthy, swimming with wine, littered with wilting 
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garlands and fishbones.’ What more could anyone have seen who had entered the room? 
(trans. Russell, slightly adapted) 
 
Now from a modern perspective, this passage does not live up to the strong claim which 
Quintilian makes for it. While it may be ‘graphic’ in a loose sense of that word, it offers such 
sparse information about the outward appearances of the banquet hall and the banqueters that 
an actual witness would surely have seen more than it records.11 Its effect rather depends on the 
careful selection of ‘telling’ details, but if we are precise about that, it must be acknowledged 
that the reference to ‘seeing’ obscures the fact that the impact of these details is not so much 
sensory as semantic, that is based on what Vasaly calls the words’ ‘symbolical meanings’ -- of, 
say, the ‘tottering’ (vacillantis), from which readers can infer the guests’ drunkenness, or of the 
‘garlands’ (coronis), which should have no place at a Roman dinner table.12 
However, because of the phantasia-theory outlined above, things may have looked different 
from an ancient point of view. If for Quintilian and others the generous provision of visual 
details does not seem to be at stake, then this is perhaps because of the perceived clarity of 
phantasiai and their close connection with words and prior visual perception: as long as authors 
verbalised the picture to be painted in a series of stock motifs of which they could assume 
readers to have prior visual experience, then the latter could also be assumed to be able to ‘work 
their way back up the chain’ and ‘reconstruct (...) the original mental image which gave rise to 
the words that prompt the reader’s own mental image’.13 A strong belief on the part of ancient 
critics that a few concrete words effortlessly evoked mental images may even have blinded 
them to other possibly relevant linguistic aspects of enargeia: in accounting for the vividness 
of a description like Cicero’s ‘we might prefer to focus on the use of figures, on the choice of 
vocabulary and the arrangement of words. But this is not the case for ancient critics’.14 
Furthermore, since phantasiai (as elicited by words, but not words qua words) were regarded 
as the basis of thought, ancient critics may have almost automatically rolled visual and more 
reflective responses into one; when Quintilian and others talk about ‘seeing’ the storyworld, 
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this involves, in the words of Webb’s slogan, both ‘sight and insight’, as ‘seeing’ phantasiai in 
the mind’s eye was but the starting point for a more elaborate response, which ‘brings with it 
knowledge, both intellectual and sensory’.15 
Finally, in line with a current trend in classics to cast even basic sensory and cognitive 
processes as socio-intellectual constructs,16 it has been suggested that these considerations may 
have more than purely theoretical significance. Vasaly speculates that ancient readers ‘may well 
have possessed powers of pictorial visualization much greater and more intense than our own’.17 
Germany thinks that they may have been ‘peculiarly susceptible to vivid descriptions’, as that 
‘would certainly explain a great deal about why our sources speak about enargeia the way they 
do and with such perfect consistency’.18 Webb, finally, sketches a culture in which a strong 
belief in the power and communicability of mental images and rhetorical training inspired by 
that belief produced readers who could be counted upon as a matter of course to be ‘constantly 
engaged in a process of calling up, developing and reflecting on these images’.19  
 
3 Some Shortcomings of the Pictorialist Account 
 
While the pictorialist account of enargeia is illuminating in certain respects, I think we should 
be wary of attributing ‘intense’ powers of ‘pictorial visualization’ to Greek and Roman readers 
too soon. Apart from the fact that such a move must remain speculative -- and on balance it 
seems implausible that ancient and modern readers had very different cognitive capacities -- it 
risks blinding us to an alternative possibility, namely that in important ways enargeia differs 
from ordinary conceptions of ‘pictorial vividness’, not in degree, but in kind. For instance, are 
we really to suppose that Quintilian -- of all people, and in a discussion of the ornate style -- 
was less sensitive than ‘we’ are to, say, the string of asyndetic and partly anaphoric clauses in 
Cicero’s vignette and that these played no role in his choice of this passage as an outstanding 
example of visually compelling writing? And what are we to make of the fact that enargeia 
(and ekphrasis, for that matter) is routinely used to characterise not only (not necessarily 
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elaborate) descriptions of static scenery and objects, but also fast-paced narrative passages, such 
as the Iliadic horse race or Xenophon’s account of Cunaxa?20 Rather than regarding these and 
other stylistic features of enargeia as irrelevant or as indications of the ease and intensity with 
which ancient readers allegedly formed mental images, we may wish to ask if mental images 
are always the best way of thinking about enargeia. 
When we turn from the stylistic to the experiential side of things, similar questions rise. 
What are we to make, for instance, of the fact that, as Webb has recently remarked, ancient 
authors often speak as if enargeia involves the visualization of a scene, ‘not simply as in a 
distanced, disembodied photograph, but as if we were present ourselves within the same space, 
in bodily contact with the place and its happenings’?21 One may here compare how the scholiast 
cited above likens the readers of the Iliad to the captivated intradiegetic audience of the horse 
race for Patroclus, how Plutarch suggests that Xenophon’s enargeia elicits a sense of being 
physically present in the plain of Cunaxa or how Quintilian envisages the audience of Cicero’s 
vignette as having ‘entered’ the banquet hall. And finally, while it is clear that enargeia was 
supposed by ancient critics to provide certain kinds of understanding which we are not used to 
putting under the rubric of (mere) ‘sight’, is ‘insight’ always the best term to typify the surplus 
of ‘meaning’ generated by enargeia? Thus, Quintilian’s claim that a speech requires enargeia 
if it is to ‘dominate’ the judge surely carries a hint that displaying the subject-matter to the 
mind’s eye is an effective way for an orator to avoid inviting too much contemplation;22 
Plutarch’s claim that, due to enargeia, readers of Xenophon will experience the same emotions 
as the actual participants in the Battle of Cunaxa (‘sharing in the dangers’) does not read as if 
he thought of himself and others as routinely investing mental images with intellectual and 
emotional meaning in a gradual and inferential process of sense-making; it is rather suggestive 
of a more immediate, knee-jerk and visceral, sort of response. 
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In considering such questions, it is important to note that ancient critics themselves appear 
to have felt the need to redefine the philosophical terms they adopted. Cicero, for one, always 
translates enargeia as evidentia in philosophical, but as inlustratio in literary contexts, which 
may indicate that for him the ‘clarity’ of the mental images resulting from visual perception 
was not the same as visual ‘vividness’ in literature.23 Ps.-Longinus (Subl. 15.1) presents his 
emotionally charged definition of phantasia, ‘when under the influence of inspiration and 
emotion you seem to see what you describe and place it before the eyes of the readers’, as a 
break with the Stoic usage of the term.24 Quintilian (Inst. 6.2.29-30) introduces his discussion 
of the arousal of emotions through enargeia by providing a double gloss on phantasia: he uses 
the word not only for discrete mental images (imagines), but also for the human capacity 
actively to engage the imagination (visiones) and to do so in such a way that at times we no 
longer seem to ‘think’ (cogitare), but actually to ‘do’ (facere) what we imagine.25 To be sure, 
formulations like these describe ‘intense’ responses, but they have little to do with philosophical 
ideas about mental images passively received and contemplated in the theatre of the mind. 
For such reasons I propose now to abandon the notion of mental images as the explanatory 
medium and of ‘seeing’ such images in the mind’s eye as the phenomenon to be explained and 
to examine instead if the non-representationalist enactivist theory of vision and imagination can 
help us develop a more precise account of some crucial stylistic and experiential aspects of 
enargeia. On the assumption that the main thrust of enactivism is correct, this is not a priori 
implausible. As we have seen, the significance of the pictorialist terminology used by ancient 
critics should not be overestimated; certainly terms like enargeia and phantasia did not retain 
their full philosophical meanings when they were transferred to a new context. And since 
rhetorical theory is ultimately a distillation of what worked best in practice, it is not unlikely 
that where our sources depart from the philosophical understanding of the imagination, both in 
their analytical remarks and in the examples which they adduce, they offer glimpses of actual, 
and cognitively realistic, reader responses.26 Of course, this does not mean that there existed a 
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full-blown conception of the readerly imagination as enactivist in antiquity or that pictorialist 
preconceptions did not influence critical and readerly practice. It does, however, raise the 
possibility that ‘pictorialism’ is not the whole story and that the enactivist framework can help 
us bring out strands of enargeia which have hitherto remained underappreciated. 
 
4 The Enactivist Account of Visual Experience and Imagination 
 
The widespread view that picture-like mental images are indispensible to the proper functioning 
of the imagination, conceived of as simulated vision, arises in part from the folk-psychological 
assumption that visual perception itself is like taking detailed, high-resolution ‘snapshots’ of 
the world.27 Noë’s enactivist theory of visual perception, takes issue with this view.28 Noë infers 
from much-discussed perceptual phenomena such as inattentional and change blindness that the 
perceived world is not in fact like a gap-free and detailed photograph, and posits instead that 
vision is, to a substantial degree, selective and attention-dependent.29 The world, that is, is not 
given, but ‘made available’ by the activity of the observer, who attends to selected aspects of it 
through appropriate movements of the eyes, head and body.30 One might think here of how, 
when we attentively follow a tennis match, for instance, we have only a dim visual awareness 
of the crowd or the stadium. Yet, the world does not ‘feel’ gappy to us, because we know that 
we can always ‘look’ further as and when we need to, by moving our eyes, head and body to 
focus on different aspects of the environment. 
The enactivist account understands vision in terms of an on-going, attentive interaction 
between an embodied observer and the environment, mediated by the observer’s mastery of the 
laws of sensorimotor contingencies, defined as the regularities in how sensory stimulation 
depends on the movements of the perceiver or the percept.31 Our bodies, that is, relate to 
interaction potentials (‘affordances’) of the environment, as is measurable in neuronal activity 
associated with anticipatory movements that occur during perception in ‘the whole neurally 
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enlivened body’.32 As this sensorimotor feedback gives us information about what it would be 
like to interact with the environment, we perceive it in these terms. Actual and potential 
movements – both of the observer’s eyes, head and body and of the observed entities – so gain 
salience for visual perception. To make this tangible, one can think of how a tennis player 
directs her gaze and whole-body intention to an incoming ball, incorporating its trajectory – she 
literally moves with the ball and ‘feels’ it approaching – and thereby at the same time already 
prepares for a well-aimed return.33 
The claim that vision is enactive entails the claim that it is ‘smart’, in that it determines the 
basic way in which we make sense of (‘enact’) the world.34 Thus, the enactivist theory of vision 
delivers everything we need in order to explain how the tennis player from our example hits the 
return; there is no need to evoke further cognitive acts on her part, such as her forming a belief 
about, say, the speed or size of the ball on the basis of ‘snapshots’ of it, and to posit that such 
‘higher-order’ mental processes go into planning the return. On an enactivist view, the player’s 
conscious experience of things like the size, voluminousness and distance of the ball is due to 
sensorimotor feedback (based on previous visual interactions with this or similar balls), which 
emerges during, and so is part and parcel of, visual perception.35 A similar case has been made 
for the ‘emotional colouration’ of visual perception (e.g. the felt excitement and exhilaration 
involved in preparing and hitting a return); on an enactivist view, the neural activation 
associated with this is indicative, not of a separate cognitive act (by which I infer something 
from what I see), but of how embodied emotions inform visual perception from the start.36 
According to a number of cognitive scientists, finally, the ‘smartness’ of visual perception 
extends to ‘primary intersubjectivity’, that is the human ability directly to see other people’s 
movements in the context of the surrounding world as expressive of specific intentions and 
emotions.37 On an enactivist view, our interactions with people at this level do not involve 
advanced inferential cognitive processes based on a ‘Theory of Mind’, but a visually mediated 
bodily attunement between two or more agents. An example is how our tennis player’s return 
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depends on her ability to incorporate not just the ball’s trajectory, but also the movements of 
her opponent. Evidence from research into mirror neurons, which shows that the perception of 
an action activates the same areas of the brain as executing that action, indicates that our direct 
grasp of what others are doing is facilitated by a mechanism which connects their bodies to 
ours.38 While the interpretation of this evidence is controversial, it seems that our perception of 
others’ actions always involves a proprioceptive component, and in marked cases -- Fuchs and 
De Jaegher give the example of someone absorbed in watching the salto mortale of an aerial 
acrobat -- our engagement with others’ bodies in action may reach a degree of ‘fascination’, 
which may cause our lived body to reach toward and ‘conjoin’ with the acrobat’s swinging 
movements to the extent that we may be prompted to co-movements.39 
If this is what visual perception is like, then what does that entail for the imagination, defined 
as simulated vision? The enactivist account suggests that the phenomenal similarity between 
‘seeing’ and ‘imagining’ is not to be found in their alleged content, namely mental images (for 
we do not take detailed ‘snapshots’ of the world to begin with), but in the embodied, enactive 
structure of experience: to imagine something, that is, is to simulate an embodied exploration 
of what one imagines.40 It is like ‘going through the motions’ of actual visual perception, but 
in the frame of ‘as if’ and with sensorimotor feedback (often called ‘resonances’ in this context) 
provided from memory rather than the environment. It is by definition multimodal, involving 
(like, on the enactivist account, the experience of basic agency itself) the whole sensorimotor 
array, including the exteroceptive modalities, dominated by vision, and proprioceptive and 
kinesthetic modalities (a sensory awareness of bodily postures, movements as well as embodied 
aspects of emotions).41 If mental images are involved, they are at best a by-product of our 
‘imaginings’, are ‘undergone’ rather than inwardly ‘seen’, and need not specify more features 
than are relevant to the imagined experience at hand.42 For the vividness of the imagination 
does not depend on the amount of detail ‘seen’, but on a distinct, bodily-perceptual ‘feel’ that 
is akin to that of actual visual perception. 
                                                 
38
 E.g. Rizzolatti and Craighero 2004. For discussion, cf. Gallagher 2001: 101-3; 2008: 540-2. 
39
 Fuchs and De Jaegher 2009: 473-4. 
40
 See Caracciolo 2014: 98-100; Kuzmičová 2012b: 26. Excellent treatments of ‘enactment imagination’ are 
Thomas 1999; Thompson 2007. Evidence from eye-tracking experiments shows that imagining involves the same 
tracing of sensorimotor patterns as actual vision; see Spivey and Geng 2001; Johansson et al. 2006. 
41
 Kuzmičová 2012b: 24; 2013: 115. 
42
 Thompson 2007: 156; see Caracciolo 2014: 100, Troscianko 2013: 186. 
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In the following sections I will discuss two complementary ways in which modern critics 
have applied enactivist insights to quasi-visual reader responses, and which seem to me to 
resonate with how ancient critics talk about enargeia. The first focuses on how texts can model 
the ‘probing’ structure of enactive visual experiences and so may prompt vivid (lifelike, intense, 
smooth) simulations of such experiences. The second is concerned with the story-driven, 
imaginative equivalent of the real-life phenomenon of ‘fascination’. In making the case for 
embodied reader responses I will be relying on recent linguistic research which emphasises the 
embodied aspects of language comprehension, such as that of Zwaan, who understands 
language as ‘a set of cues to the comprehender to construct an experiential (perception plus 
action) simulation of the described situation’, and comprehension as ‘the vicarious experience 
of the described situation’.43 Increasingly, evidence is accumulating that the ‘depth’ of such 
embodied processing varies depending on the kinds of language used, and that readers’ 
responses to words through their bodies may lead to fully-fledged bodily feelings which can be 
linked to a sense of ‘presence’ or ‘immersion’ in the storyworld.44 
 
5 Enacting Narrative Space: Enargeia from ‘Seeing’ to ‘Looking’ 
 
When one starts thinking about concrete stylistic differences between the pictorialist and 
enactivist models of readerly visualization, some of them come down to the issue of detail. The 
enactivist approach does not set much store by detailed mental images and even suggests that 
elaborate descriptions may be baffling rather than stimulating, because they contradict the 
economy and selectivity intrinsic to our normal enactive-perceptual engagement with the 
world.45 In fact, descriptions arguably become more vivid if they play on the fallibility of our 
‘pictorial’ vision than if they try to fill in all the details.46 It is interesting to note in this respect 
that in Cicero’s vignette of the banquet hall, cited by Quintilian as a star example of enargeia, 
the words ‘I seemed to see’ (videbar videre) indicate that, from the very start, the scene which 
is about to be described could not be clearly seen. There may, to be sure, have been good reasons 
to emphasise the point. Perhaps the first-person observer (Cicero himself?) was ashamed to 
look closely at so abject a scene and kept his eyes turned on the floor, or it was dawn and the 
                                                 
43
 Zwaan 2004: 36. 
44
 See Zwaan 2008; 2014; Kuijpers and Miall 2011. Sanford and Emmott (2012: 103-31) provide an overview 
of experimental research in this area. I will refer to some specialised studies below. 
45
 Cf. Jajdelska et al. 2010: 442-3; Troscianko 2013: 188; 2014: 129; Kuzmičová 2012a: 309; 2012b: 36. 
46
 See Troscianko 2014: 144-59. 
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first light only made visible the contours of the guests and a few gleaming wet patches on the 
floor. But for present purposes the relevant point is that to Quintilian’s mind the lack of a ‘clear 
view’ apparently did not stand in the way of enargeia. So, what could it have been about this 
passage he found visually compelling? 
Part of the answer is, I think, that the passage is structured so as to enable readers to undergo 
an enactive visual exploration of the represented space. First, the words videbar videre inscribe 
an internal point of view into the text and suggest that the following description will to some 
extent be tailored to the body and sensory systems of an embedded human observer.47 To this 
we can add the present participles (‘coming in’ (intrantis), etc.), which configure the actions 
they express as on-going and as currently being perceived, and the way in which the guests’ 
comings and goings are described in relation to the internal viewpoint.48 Secondly, the 
description does not simply enumerate sense-data, but conveys the impression that the scene is 
scanned by someone moving her eyes and head in accordance with the enactivist view of how 
we ‘look around’ and with the principle of selective visual attention; each of the asyndetic and 
anaphoric clauses (‘alios ..., alios ..., quosdam ... quosdam ...’) can even be understood as an 
instance of ‘looking’ preceded by movement, with the repeated words honing in on the entities 
to which the observer’s attention is drawn each time.49 The term ‘experiential iconicity’ has 
been coined for linguistic structures which are iconic, not of the represented entities, but of the 
perception of those entities.50 
It is plausible that Quintilian was sensitive to those features of the passage on which an 
enactivist approach also hones in. First, embedded viewpoints and the linguistic means of 
shaping them are often associated with enargeia in our sources. A late Roman treatise on figures 
of thought actually defines enargeia in terms of the manipulation of deictic elements which 
establish an internal viewpoint. It commends a line of Virgil that uses the historical present 
(‘The men are visible (apparent) floating scattered on the vast waters’) for expressing the action 
‘as if present’ (quasi praesenti), and one that uses proximal spatial deictics (‘Here (hic) the 
army of the Dolopes had its camp, here (hic) savage Achilles’) for making it seem as if the 
entities so pointed to are ‘within our field of vision’ (in conspectu nostro).51 The historical 
                                                 
47
 Cf. Kuzmičová 2012a: 301-2; 2012b: 40; Troscianko 2014: 168; Caracciolo 2014: 101, 103-5. 
48
 Manieri (1998: 142) comments on ‘l’immediatezza’ of the present participles in our passage. 
49
 Cf. Otto (2009: 118), who notes how the successive clauses seem to represent ‘die Bewegung der Augen’. 
For the general point, see Troscianko 2014: 125-6; Caracciolo 2014: 102. 
50
 Wolf 2001. 
51
 Anon. Schem. Dian. 1 Halm, citing V. Aen. 1.118, 2.29. See Ryan (2001: 130-9) for a modern discussion of 
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present is also repeatedly associated with enargeia in the scholia,52 and Ps.-Longinus (Subl. 25) 
praises Xenophon’s and Thucydides’ use of the device, because it makes it seem as if past 
events ‘were happening now and were present’ (ὡς γινόμενα καὶ παρόντα).53 Quintilian (Inst. 
9.2.41-3) himself, finally, knows a figure called ‘transference of time’ (tralatio temporum) or 
metastasis, which is achieved either by prefacing a scene with explicit references to ‘seeing’ or 
by using the historical present;54 this makes it likely that he felt that both ‘videbar videre’ and 
the present participles in the Ciceronian vignette contributed to enargeia. 
Furthermore, ancient authors seem to have appreciated the fact that ‘looking’ involves bodily 
movement. Polybius (3.38.5) significantly instructs his readers that, ‘just as in the case of actual 
visual perception (ἐπὶ τῆς ὁράσεως) we are used to always turning our faces (συνεπιστρέφειν 
ἀεὶ τὰ πρόσωπα) towards the object pointed out to us, so too should we mentally (τῇ διανοίᾳ) 
ever turn and shift our glance (συνδιανεύειν καὶ συρρέπειν) to the geographical locations to 
which the story points’.55 The clearest indication that it was known that such movements could 
be mirrored in certain rhetorical figures and so enhance visual vividness comes in Ps.-Longinus’ 
analysis of a famous Demosthenic passage which describes the effects of a blow on the victim: 
 
πολλὰ γὰρ ἂν ποιήσειεν ὁ τύπτων, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὧν ὁ παθὼν ἔνι’ οὐδ’ ἂν ἀπαγγεῖλαι 
δύναιθ’ ἑτέρῳ, τῷ σχήματι, τῷ βλέμματι, τῇ φωνῇ, ὅταν ὡς ὑβρίζων, ὅταν ὡς ἐχθρὸς 
ὑπάρχων, ὅταν κονδύλοις, ὅταν ἐπὶ κόρρης. ταῦτα κινεῖ, ταῦτ’ ἐξίστησιν ἀνθρώπους αὑτῶν, 
ἀήθεις ὄντας τοῦ προπηλακίζεσθαι. (Dem. 21.72) 
 
Many things, Athenians, some of which the victim would find it difficult to put into words, 
may be done by the striker – by gesture, by look, by tone; when he strikes in wantonness or 
out of enmity; with the fist or on the cheeck. These are the things that provoke men and make 
them besides themselves, if they are unused to insult. 
 
                                                 
how the manipulation of spatiotemporal deixis contributes to ‘immersion’, and Allan (2013) for a recent analysis 
of the Greek historical present along these lines. 
52
 Meijering 1987: 42-3; Nünlist 2009: 196. Add Donatus, Comm. in Ter. Hec. 295: ‘“obtrudit” pro 
“obtrudebat”: ἐνάργεια temporis’ (also Eun. 594, Hec. 174). 
53
 Note the similar language used by Plutarch of Xenophon; his account of Cunaxa is rich in historical presents. 
54
 Cf. Lausberg 1998: 363; Sheppard 2014: 35. 
55
 Cf. Meijering 1987: 47-8. Polybius seems to think of his readers as pouring over a large map of the 
Mediterranean in their imaginations (rather than as ‘embedded’ observers). 
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Ps.-Longinus (Subl. 20.1-2) mentions ‘the asyndeta in combination with the cases of anaphora 
and the vivid description’ (ταῖς ἀναφοραῖς ὁμοῦ καὶ τῇ διατυπώσει συναναπεπλεγμένα τὰ 
ἀσύνδετα) as contributing to a sense that ‘the orator accomplishes the same as the assailant: he 
strikes the jurors’ minds with blow after blow’. Readers, then, are in the position of the victim 
of the attack and may experience what Ps.-Longinus tellingly describes as a ‘disturbance and 
co-movement of the mind’ (φορὰ ψυχῆς καὶ συγκίνησις). In my view, the term συγκίνησις is 
suggestive of how readers may imaginatively follow the virtual blows, encoded in the text, with 
their eyes in an effort to duck the blow; the addition ‘of the mind’ refers only to the fact that 
readers do not actually start turning left and right, but in all other respects what they feel is 
physical (reliant on sensorimotor resonances).56 While Ps.-Longinus does not discuss this 
example under the header of enargeia or phantasia, the effect which he describes could clearly 
be called that.57 The term διατύπωσις is a common synonym of enargeia (and apt here, as it is 
indicative of the almost physical impression which the virtual blows make), and we will see 
below that συγκίνησις is closely associated with phantasia in On the Sublime. Other critics also 
associate rhetorical figures like anaphora and asyndeton with enargeia.58 
Apart from these more or less explicit discussions of relevant stylistic features, it should be 
noted that examples of visually ‘vivid’ writing adduced in our sources often contain an internal 
point of view, tied to a character, explicit indications of bodily movement or travel -- this maybe 
reflects a sense that in order to make readers consciously aware of the virtual movements on 
which vividness depends, it helps textually to specify (and exaggerate) them -- and experiential 
iconicity.59 One relevant example is a celebrated passage from Demosthenes describing the 
destruction of Phocis: 
                                                 
56
 I will return to this term in the next Section. On kinēsis-language in ancient criticism, see Meijering 1987: 
44-47; Nünlist 2009: 139-40. Both, however, play down its bodily connotations. Pace Russell 1964: 135: ‘συν- 
(...) merely emphasizes the completeness or thoroughness of the disturbance’. 
57
 Cf. Anon. Segu. 111, which gives the Demosthenic passage as an example of enargeia. 
58
 Hermogenes (Id. 303.1-8 Rabe, citing Dem. 19.10) uses the term to describe the effect of epanaphora kata 
komma, as in the Demosthenic phrase προσιὼν μὲν τῇ βουλῇ, προσιὼν δὲ τῷ δήμῳ (‘coming forward to the 
Council, and coming forward to the people’). See also Ps.-Demetrius (Eloc. 211-15) on the enargeia of dilogia or 
‘figures involving repetition’, with the discussions of Manieri 1998: 134-5; Otto 2009: 80-3. 
59
 For internal viewpoints, cf. Walker 1993; Webb 2016: 211-3; Otto 2009: 89 (though all three with a more 
‘psychological’ slant than mine). For ‘travel’, see e.g. Ps.-Longin. Subl. 26.2 on Hdt. 2.29; Σ bT Il. 14.226-7: the 
lines enumerate locations past and through which Hera moves on her flight from Olympus to Lemnos; the scholiast 
comments that ‘the mind (ἡ διάνοια) of the readers travels alongside her (συμπαραθέουσα) and is brought to 




ὅτε γὰρ νῦν ἐπορευόμεθ’ εἰς Δελφούς, ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἦν ὁρᾶν ἡμῖν πάντα ταῦτα, οἰκίας 
κατεσκαμμένας, τείχη περιῃρημένα, χώραν ἔρημον τῶν ἐν ἡλικίᾳ, γύναια δὲ καὶ παιδάρι’ 
ὀλίγα καὶ πρεσβύτας ἀνθρώπους οἰκτρούς. (Dem. 19.65) 
 
So when we were now travelling to Delphi, necessity compelled us to look upon that scene 
-- homesteads levelled with the ground, cities stripped of their defensive walls, a countryside 
all emptied of its young men; only women, a few little children, and old men stricken with 
misery. 
 
This passage was much praised for its visual ‘vividness’ in antiquity.60 However, like Cicero’s 
vignette, it is not rich in details, so that it is hard to see how its enargeia can be bound up with 
any ‘pictorial’ qualities. Rather, it is notable for combining a reference to human observers on 
the spot (ἦν ὁρᾶν ἡμῖν), a verb of movement (ἐπορευόμεθα) and experiential iconicity (short 
clauses and asyndeton).61 The enactivist framework helps us understand how these features 
contribute to eliciting vivid quasi-visual responses from readers and, I would maintain, why 
ancient critics were drawn to this passage when looking for examples of enargeia. 
 
6 Enacting Bodily Movement: Enargeia from Pity to Fear 
 
There is one further aspect of Cicero’s vignette which contributes to its visual vividness, and 
that is that the internal observer’s attention is mostly drawn to aspects of the scene which, on 
an enactivist view, are cognitively salient. The focus on the floor, for instance, which at first 
sight seems strange,62 in fact gets things just right, both because it highlights a crucial element 
of rooms, in that their canonical affordances of reposing and moving about in them depend on 
it and because it gives the internal observer whose visual perception the reader simulates a solid 
surface virtually to stand on, which likely increases the sense of ‘presence’.63 Furthermore, the 
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 Cf. Webb 2016: 213. Cf. Nik. Progymn. 71.1-5 Felten; Σ Dem. 19.157c Dilts (misplaced from 19.65); Alex. 
De fig. III.25.13-25 Spengel; Anon. Segu. 111.  
61
 Also note the ‘presentifying’ deictic νῦν (‘now’), although all sources quote a version of the passage without 
this word. 
62
 Cf. Otto 2009: 119. 
63
 For the desirability of stressing canonical affordances, see Kuzmičová 2012b: 31; Troscianko 2014: 137-8, 
142; Cave 2016: 46-8. Cf. Kuzmičová 2012b: 28; 2013: 117: ‘The imaginary world is unlikely to feel tangible and 
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initial focus on the banqueters’ comings and goings matches the fact that movements are a 
natural focal point of our selective visual attention and, as readers virtually follow the 
represented people around, it also evokes a sense of three-dimensional space more effectively 
than a disembodied description of the room’s dimensions would. Furthermore, since ‘entering’ 
and ‘exiting’ belong to the most common affordances of rooms, the narrative rendition of these 
actions is also likely to elicit from readers a more vivid sense of the presence of walls and doors 
than a detailed description of such furnishings: we know (perceptually, that is immediately and 
experientially) how it feels like to perform such actions and what they look like to an observer, 
because it is at the level of such actions that we ourselves perceptually-enactively experience 
the world and know others to experience it.64 
Like seeing such bodily actions being performed in real life, imagining them involves a 
proprioceptive component; indeed, imagining actions, the vividness of which depends on one’s 
awareness of sensorimotor processes in one’s own body, may to some extent always cut through 
an inner-outer dichotomy. This helps us understand, I think, why the focus on bodily actions, 
which is so prominent a feature of Cicero’s vignette, may do more than just contribute to spatial 
vividness and also tell us something about what readers may get out of ‘seeing’ this scene. Take 
the example of the banqueters said almost to ‘keel over’ (vacillantis). As we have seen, on a 
pictorialist account, this is a ‘telling’ detail from which readers may infer certain things about 
the physical and psychological state of the people in question. However, the enactivist account 
of ‘smart’ vision allows for a different approach. On this view, readers do not infer the guests’ 
predicament as general knowledge, as a conceptual abstraction, but understand it experientially, 
by ‘incorporating’ the action involved, by catching, as it were, an echo of the described 
movement in their bones.65 Since this understanding is perceptual-enactive, immediate and 
prereflective, it can be experienced as visually vivid. 
This cognitive perspective can be supplemented by a linguistic one. When one thinks about 
the precise semantic nuances of bodily-action verbs -- for instance, about how ‘keeling over’ 
                                                 
present unless physical stimuli that can be interacted with are mentioned (or strongly implied), that is, unless the 
furnishing of the imaginary world is reached, grasped, manipulated, leaned against, and so forth.’ From a non-
enactivist perspective, Scarry (1995) argues that indications of the ‘solidity’ of a room’s surfaces contributes 
markedly to its imageability. 
64
 Grünbaum 2007: 307-9, and especially 308, on how the rendition of bodily movements ‘[i]n a direct and 
quasi-perceptible (ready for visual imagining) way (...) manifests a spatial situation, which as a whole is strung 
together by the familiar patterns of movement and orientation’. 
65
 I owe this formulation to Cave 2016: 63. 
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subtly differs from, say, ‘tottering’, ‘dropping down’ or ‘foundering’ -- it becomes clear that 
these are difficult to capture in abstract terms; rather, it seems that we distinguish such verbs 
by their appearance (how they develop in space and time) and how they ‘feel’ in the body.66 
Bodily-action verbs have therefore been a prime focus of research into how language processing 
activates regions of the brain associated with perception and kinesthesia; motor resonances of 
motion verbs have been posited in readers and also observed directly in neuroimaging studies.67 
It has also been shown that readers simulate vertical and horizontal movements as expressed or 
implied by verb phrases,68 as well as the orientation of objects as implied by the use to which 
they are said to be put.69  
Now in the passage from Cicero, an outside perspective on the guests’ drunken shenanigans 
probably predominates and the enactment of the movement of ‘keeling over’ only has a modest 
and nearly imperceptible role to play in readers’ reception of the passage. There are, however, 
many indications in ancient criticism that ancient readers’ quasi-visual responses included the 
enactment of bodily actions described in the text.70 In general, it is remarkable how many 
examples of passages said to possess the quality of enargeia are ‘full of details of human 
action’,71 and how often readers are implicitly compared to the emotionally involved audiences 
of sports matches, perhaps the paradigmatic example of ‘fascinated’ spectators in the sense of 
Fuchs and De Jaegher (see Section 4 above).72 Indeed, ‘fascination’ often seems to me as 
appropriate a way as any to typify the ‘intensity’ of ancient readers’ quasi-visual engagement 
with literature. The clearest example is Ps.-Longinus’ treatment of phantasia. As we have seen 
in Section 3 above, according to this critic (Subl. 15.1-2) phantasia comes about, ‘when under 
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 Kemmerer 2006: 350; see Cave 2016: 109-10. 
67
 Zwaan 2009, and Pulvermüller 2005, respectively. 
68
 Richardson et al. 2003. 
69
 Stanfield and Zwaan 2001; Zwaan and Madden 2005. Cf. Bolens 2012: 13: ‘If a text describes a person 
hammering a nail into a wall, readers simulate a horizontal nail, whereas the nail is simulated as vertical if it is 
said to be pounded into the floor’. 
70
 Kuzmičová (2012b; 2013) speaks of ‘motor enactment’ to typify this respone, Bolens (2012) of ‘kinesic 
empathy’, Caracciolo (2014: 160) of how readers may ‘imaginatively project themselves into the character’s 
fictional body’. 
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 Webb 2009: 109; examples also in Calame 1991; Calboli Montefusco 2005. 
72
 The Iliadic horse race is commented on by Ps.-Demetrius (Eloc. 210) and various scholia; see Grethlein and 
Huitink 2017: 76-7. Quintilian (Inst. 8.3.63) gives the boxing match from V. Aen. 5.426ff. as his first example of 
enargeia; in a highly metaliterary passage, Heliodorus (4.3.4) describes the vivid effects of a story about a foot 
race on the audience; see for analysis, see Grethlein 2015: 270-2. 
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the influence of inspiration and emotion you seem to see what you describe and place it before 
the eyes of the readers’. He goes on to specify that phantasiai ‘seek emotion and excitement’ 
(τό τε <παθητικὸν> ἐπιζητοῦσι καὶ τὸ συγκεκινημένον), and in poetry even aim at the stunning 
emotional impact he calls ekplēxis. I will return to these terms below. He next refers to several 
passages in support of these claims, the two most elaborate of which concern excerpts from 
Euripidean messenger speeches. The first is from Iphigenia in Tauris and relates how Orestes 
was (actually or in his imagination) attacked by Erinyes:73 
 
κἀν τῷδε πέτραν ἅτερος λιπὼν ξένοιν 
ἔστη κάρα τε διετίναξ’ ἄνω κάτω 
κἀπεστέναξεν ὠλένας τρέμων ἄκρας, 
μανίαις ἀλαίνων, καὶ βοᾷ· ‘Κυνωπίδα, 
Πυλάδη, δέδορκας τήνδε; τήνδε δ’ οὐχ ὁρᾷς 
Ἅιδου δράκαιναν, ὥς με βούλεται κτανεῖν 
δειναῖς ἐχίδναις εἰς ἔμ’ ἐστομωμένη; 
ἣ ’κ γειτόνων δὲ πῦρ πνέουσα καὶ φόνον 
πτεροῖς ἐρέσσει, μητέρ’ ἀγκάλαις ἐμὴν 
ἔχουσα, πέτρινον ὄγκον, ὡς ἐπεμβάλῃ. 
οἴμοι, κτενεῖ με· ποῖ φύγω;’ (Eur. IT 281-90) 
 
Meanwhile one of the two strangers left the cliff and stood there and tossed his head this 
way and that. He groaned, his arms trembling to his fingertips, swaying because of the 
onslaughts of madness, and shouted, ‘Pylades, don’t you see this hound-faced one? And 
don’t you see this one, a she-dragon from hell, how she wants to kill me, brandishing 
her fearsome snakes at me? And next to her, one breathing fire and gore beats her wings 
and holds my mother in her arms, a mass of stone, to hurl at me! Ah, she will kill me! 
Where can I escape to?’ 
 
In response to this passage, Ps.-Longinus writes: 
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 In fact, Ps.-Longinus (Subl. 15.2) first cites Eur. Or. 255-7, another, and much briefer, vision of Erinyes, 
which awards them only two descriptive adjectives (αἱματωποὺς καὶ δρακοντώδεις) and then IT 290 (οἴμοι [...] 
φύγω;). However, ancient quotation practices make it likely that he had the whole passage in view (or at least the 
entirety of Orestes’ directly quoted speech), and this likelihood is increased because of the structural similarities 




ἐνταῦθ’ ὁ ποιητὴς αὐτὸς εἶδεν Ἐρινύας·  ὃ δ’ ἐφαντάσθη, μικροῦ δεῖν θεάσασθαι καὶ 
τοὺς ἀκούοντας ἠνάγκασεν. (Subl. 15.2) 
 
Here the poet himself saw Erinyes and as good as compelled his readers to see what he 
imagined. 
 
The second is from Euripides’ Phaethon and concerns the eponymous character’s ill-fated 
journey through the heavens; the longest continuous portion starts with a line of direct speech 
containing Zeus’ final instructions and continues with the start of Phaethon’s journey: 
 
‘ἵει δ’, ἐφ’ ἑπτὰ Πλειάδων ἔχων δρόμον.’ 
τοσαῦτ’ ἀκούσας παῖς ἔμαρψεν ἡνίας·  
κρούσας δὲ πλευρὰ πτεροφόρων ὀχημάτων 
μεθῆκεν, αἱ δ’ ἔπταντ’ ἐπ’ αἰθέρος πτύχας. 
πατὴρ δ’ ὄπισθε νῶτα Σειρίου βεβὼς 
ἵππευε παῖδα νουθετῶν·  ‘ἐκεῖσ’ ἔλα, 
τῇδε στρέφ’ ἅρμα, τῇδε.’ 
ἆρ’ οὐκ ἂν εἴποις, ὅτι ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦ γράφοντος συνεπιβαίνει τοῦ ἅρματος καὶ 
συγκινδυνεύουσα τοῖς ἵπποις συνεπτέρωται; οὐ γὰρ ἄν, εἰ μὴ τοῖς οὐρανίοις ἐκείνοις 
ἔργοις ἰσοδρομοῦσα ἐφέρετο, τοιαῦτ’ ἄν ποτε ἐφαντάσθη. (Subl. 15.4, citing Eur. 
Phaethon, TrGF 779) 
 
‘“Steer steadily towards the seven Pleiads”. The boy listened so far, then seized the 
reins, whipped the flanks of his winged team and let them go. To heaven’s expanse they 
flew. His father rode behind on Sirius’ back, giving the boy advice: “That’s your way, 
there: turn the chariot this way, now this way”.’ Would you not say that the soul of the 
author also mounts the chariot and, sharing in the danger, takes wing with  the horses? 
For if it had not been carried along keeping pace with those actions in the heavens, he 
would never have imagined such things. 
 
Ps.-Longinus’ response to the Erinyes-passage has been thought to give expression to the 
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pictorialist idea that verbal descriptions transfer mental images from author to reader.74 
However, the passage does not seem particularly suitable for pictorial visualization, because it 
does not offer sufficient descriptive detail for readers to be able to piece together a clear and 
complete mental image of the Erinyes. It has therefore been argued that the effect of the passage 
is as much semantic as it is sensory: it depends not so much on readers ‘seeing’, say, a snake-
like figure (δράκαιναν) in the mind’s eye (such a thing may well be difficult to imagine 
anyway), as on them having bad associations with the word ‘snake’.75 The Phaethon-passage, 
which is similarly lacklustre from a pictorialist point of view, has also been thought to be 
interesting mostly for presenting a glimpse of the divine, a ‘transcendent vision’, designed to 
‘help us to understand phenomena that are beyond the normal grasp of an individual human’s 
perception’.76 
In my view, such explanations fail to capture the essence of what is going on here. While 
neither passage stands out because of its reflections on the supernatural phenomena they 
describe, they share an emphasis on the simple narration of bodily actions: thus, Phaethon 
snatches (ἔμαρψεν) the reins, whips (κρούσας) the horses’ flanks and then sets them loose 
(μεθῆκεν); Orestes gets up (ἔστη), tosses his head up and down (κάρα τε διετίναξ’ ἄνω κάτω), 
trembles to his fingertips (ὠλένας τρέμων ἄκρας) and hardly keeps his balance as his body 
precariously ‘sways’ (ἀλαίνων). I suggest that immersed readers may be led imaginatively to 
enact these movements, especially because in both passages the sensorimotor resonances 
provoked by the verb phrases are reinforced by characters’ verbalisations of perceptual-enactive 
experiences in direct speeches, which further encourage readers to enact the scenes from an 
internal perspective. The jerky movements of Orestes’ head and eyes is continued in the phrase 
he addresses to Pylades, ‘Do you see this one? And this one, don’t you see her?’ (δέδορκας 
τήνδε; τήνδε δ’ οὐχ ὁρᾷς;). The progress of Phaethon’s flight is charted in the instructions he is 
given by Zeus: ‘That’s your way, there: turn here, turn here’ (ἐκεῖσ’ ἔλα, | τῇδε στρέφ’ ἅρμα, 
τῇδε). Both lines combine instructions to turn one’s head to ‘see’, proximal spatial deictics and 
verbal repetition of these deictics, with an added asyndeton in the example from Phaethon. 
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The enactivist sensorimotor resonance framework seems to me to fit Ps.-Longinus’ markedly 
non-pictorialist comments on these passages. It is in accordance with his identification of 
ekplēxis as the chief effect of the cited phantasiai, which according to Russell expresses a 
‘surprise or fear which “knocks you out”’;77 the language of compulsion (ἠνάγκασεν) Ps.-
Longinus uses in response to Orestes’ vision implies that ekplēxis is neither entirely voluntary 
nor wholly open to rational scrutiny: ‘the more the poet succeeds in visualizing and transmitting 
the inner subjectivity of Orestes’ frenzied mental state, the more the audience’s experience (...) 
will itself approximate a kind of madness’.78 Ekplēxis, then, appears to consist in a largely 
spontaneous (even irresistible), close emotional identification with the represented characters, 
Orestes and Phaethon. Furthermore, the term τὸ συγκεκινημένον in Ps.-Longinus’ introductory 
remark, which literally means ‘movement with/alongside’, suggests that this identification 
comes about, quite precisely, by (virtual) co-movements with the represented characters which 
may accompany a state of ‘fascination’. The term is picked up in Ps.-Longinus’ comments on 
the Phaethon-passage, where the author’s (and by implication the reader’s) soul is said to mount 
the chariot with Phaethon (συνεπιβαίνει), to run risks with him (συγκινδυνεύουσα) and to take 
wings with the horses (συνεπτέρωται). Like in the previous section, I should like to argue that 
we should not be too quick to dismiss the kinēsis-language as mere metaphor; the response 
which Ps.-Longinus is after includes, I think, a felt sense of the visceral emotions which come 
with the imaginative enactment of the described movements, a stomach-churning, sickening 
fear (in the case of Orestes) or exhilaration (in the case of Phaethon). 
I end this section by drawing attention to a problem in the interpretation of Quintilian. We 
have seen in Section 3 above how Quintilian, in the context of a discussion of enargeia and the 
arousal of emotions, regards the human capacity to visualize a scene as so powerful that at times 
people do not merely seem to ‘think’ (cogitare), but even to ‘do’ (facere) what they imagine; 
he then mentions travelling, sailing, fighting, addressing a crowd and disposing of wealth as 
examples -- schoolboy daydreams indeed! He suggests that budding orators can easily learn to 
harness this capacity for rhetorical purposes and offers the outlines of a riveting murder story 
to show how they may do so: 
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 Halliwell 2011: 348. It is true that the verb used for the audience ‘seeing’ the Erinyes, θεῶμαι, often carries 
connotations of intellectual contemplation (Liddel et al. 1996: s.v. I.2), but I suspect that it was selected here 
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hominem occisum queror; non omnia, quae in re praesenti accidisse credibile est, in oculis 
habebo? non percussor ille subitus erumpet? non expavescet circumventus, exclamabit vel 
rogabit vel fugiet? non ferientem, non concidentem videbo? non animo sanguis et pallor et 
gemitus, extremus denique exspirantis hiatus insidet? insequetur ἐνάργεια, quae a Cicerone 
inlustratio et evidentia nominatur, quae non tam dicere videtur quam ostendere, et adfectus 
non aliter, quam si rebus ipsis intersimus, sequentur. (Quint. Inst. 6.2.31-2) 
 
Suppose I am complaining a man has been murdered. Am I not to have before my eyes all 
the circumstances which one can believe to have happened during the event? Will not the 
assassin burst out all of a sudden, and the victim tremble, cry for help, and either plead for 
mercy or try to escape? Shall I not see one man striking the blow and the other man falling? 
Will not the blood, the pallor, the groans, the last gasp of the dying be imprinted on my 
mind? The result will be enargeia, which Cicero calls inlustratio and evidentia, and which 
makes us seem not so much to be talking about something as exhibiting it. Emotions will 
ensue just as if we were present at the events themselves. (trans. Russell) 
 
The problem is that the introductory remarks appear to presuppose a first-person perspective, 
while the story which follows is in the third person. Webb therefore felt that the‘sense of 
empathy created by the simulacrum of presence is twofold: the orator puts himself in the place 
of an eyewitness but it is the suffering of the victim that is clearly evoked’.79 The enactivist 
view allows us to see that there is not necessarily a contradiction: an immersed reader will both 
‘see’ and ‘enact’ the actions described in the scene. This has consequences for the emotions 
(adfectus) which Quintilian thought would automatically ensue. What Quintilian thinks readers 
will feel is in the first place, I feel, the same sort of fear as the victim, which on an enactivist 
account is part and parcel of the perceptual experience and in that sense indeed automatic. This 
does not mean, of course, that in a second instance readers may not also feel pity for the victim 
and anger with the perpetrator, just like readers of Cicero’s vignette may come to reflect on the 
behaviour of the drunken guests or readers of Euripides may come to feel an emotional distance 
from Orestes in his madness or Phaethon in his foolishness. But I would suggest that such 
responses comprise a separate, higher-order cognitive act which does no longer come under the 
purview of enargeia per se. 
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This chapter started out with a critical review of the prevailing pictorialist account of enargeia. 
It suggested that this account could not properly explain a number of important stylistic and 
experiential features of the concept which are repeatedly, if sometimes allusively, flagged up 
in our sources. It therefore developed an alternative enactivist perspective on enargeia, which 
is able to account for some important properties of enargeia. Thus, on the stylistic side of things, 
we have seen that certain non-pictorial stylistic features, such as asyndeton and anaphora, do 
make a significant contribution to visual vividness and were in all probability regarded by 
ancient critics as being conducive to enargeia. It has also been shown that there is a positive 
connection between enargeia and narrative, especially the narration of bodily actions. On the 
experiential level, the enactivist view of readers’ vivid quasi-visual responses suggests that they 
always entail an embedded (internal) view of the represented scene and may also elicit a felt 
sense of bodily involvement, and this is in accordance with the way in which ancient critics talk 
about enargeia. Finally, I have argued that enargeia in the first place brings with it an emotional 
and experiential grasp of what is going on, as opposed to a reflective, intellectual understanding. 
This, too, fits the way in which ancient critics talk about readers’ quasi-visual responses. 
I should like to emphasise that I do not claim that an enactivist approach explains everything 
about enargeia. But if it is the case that readers’ quasi-visual responses to literature originate 
from a combination of biological and cognitive invariables (which I would configure as 
enactivist) and socio-culturally determined variables (which will have included pictorialist 
preconceptions), then it is both legitimate and useful to use a ‘second-generation’ cognitive 
approaches to arrive at a fuller picture of what ‘vividness’ entailed for ancient readers. As 
Kukkonen and Caracciolo state, ‘[h]istorical practices and embodiment as a biological and 
cognitive condition are not opposed but, on the contrary, caught in a dialectic relationship, so 
that exploring the background of bodily invariants can improve our understanding of historical 
specificities, and vice versa’.80 It is up to future research into ancient readers’ responses to text 
to investigate the relationship between the enactivist strands of enargeia laid bare in this chapter 
on the one hand and the folk-psychological and philosophical pictorialist theories and the 
practice of ekphrasis on the other. 
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